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Pricing Electricity in Pools With Wind Producers
Juan M. Morales, Member, IEEE, Antonio J. Conejo, Fellow, IEEE, Kai Liu, Student Member, IEEE, and
Jin Zhong, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper considers an electricity pool that includes
a significant number of wind producers and is cleared through
a network-constrained auction, one day in advance and on an
hourly basis. The hourly auction is formulated as a two-stage
stochastic programming problem, where the first stage repre-
sents the clearing of the market and the second stage models the
system operation under a number of plausible wind production
realizations. This formulation co-optimizes energy and reserve,
and allows deriving both pool energy prices and balancing energy
prices. These prices result in both cost recovery for producers
and revenue reconciliation. A case study of realistic size is used to
illustrate the functioning of the proposed pricing scheme.
Index Terms—Electricity pricing, market clearing, stochastic
programming, wind power.
NOTATION
The main notation used throughout this paper is defined
below for quick reference. For convenience, other symbols are
defined as required in the main text.
A. Indices andNumbers:
Index of system buses running from 1 to .
Index of generating units running from 1 to .
Index of wind power scenarios running from 1 to
.
Index of loads running from 1 to .
Index of wind farms running from 1 to .
B. Variables:
Voltage angle at node at the market stage [rad].
Voltage angle at node under scenario [rad].
Nodal price at which electricity transactions are
cleared at the market stage [$/MWh].
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Nodal price at which electricity transactions are
cleared at the operation stage [$/MWh].
Involuntarily load shed at bus under scenario
[MW].
Scheduled power output of generating unit [MW].
Reserve down deployed by generator under
scenario [MW].
Reserve up deployed by generator under scenario
[MW].
Wind power generation scheduled at the market
stage [MW].
Wind power generation spillage under scenario
[MW].
C. RandomVariables:
Random variable modeling the wind power
generation [MW]. represents the actual
realization of the wind power production in scenario
and therefore, it constitutes input information.
D.Constants:
Absolute value of the susceptance of line
[per unit].
Production cost offer of generating unit [$/MWh].
Offer cost of wind farm [$/MWh].
Maximum capacity of line [MW].
Power consumption by load [MW].
Capacity of unit [MW].
Probability of wind power scenario .
Maximum reserve down that can be provided by
generator [MW].
Maximum reserve up that can be provided by
generator [MW].
Value of lost load for consumer [$/MWh].
Upper bound of the power offer made by wind farm
[MW].
E. Sets:
Set of transmission lines.
Mapping of the set of consumers (loads) into the
set of buses.
Mapping of the set of generating units into the set
of buses.
Mapping of the set of wind farms into the set of
buses.
0885-8950/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and Approach
T HE increasing participation of wind producers in elec-tricity pools leads to the need for re-designing the corre-
sponding clearing algorithms to recognize the variable and un-
certain nature of such producers [1], [2].
The pool clearing algorithm proposed in this paper corre-
sponds to a single-period network-constrained auction, similar
to those used by ISO-New England [3] and PJM [4]. Clearing
takes place the day prior to power delivery on an hourly basis.
Incorporating wind producers naturally leads to a two-stage
stochastic programming formulation [5], [6]. The first stage of
this stochastic programming model represents the actual market
clearing one day ahead and results in the so-called “pool prices”,
which are obtained as dual variables of energy balance equations
at the scheduling (market) level. The second stage represents all
plausible realizations of the wind power production and results
in the so-called “balancing prices”, which correspond to the dual
variables of the balance equations for all plausible wind produc-
tion realizations. Since the network is explicitly represented in
the formulation, both pool and balancing prices are locational
marginal prices.
These prices are shown to provide cost recovery in expec-
tation for all power producers and, also in expectation, ensure
revenue reconciliation.
For the sake of simplicity and following common industry
practice, non-convexities, such as start-up costs and minimum
power outputs of production units, are not explicitly represented
in the clearing model. These issues are considered in detail in
[7]–[10].
The proposed market-clearing model is cast as a two-stage
stochastic programming problem in which the first-stage rep-
resents the anticipated dispatch (e.g., a day-ahead schedule),
while the second-stage represents the real-time dispatch.
The term “reserve deployment” (or just “deployed reserve”)
is used to refer to changes in the form of energy (MWh)
between first- and second-stage dispatches. Likewise, by “re-
serve capacity” (or just “reserve”) we refer to the available
capacity in MW to be eventually deployed, i.e., converted
to energy (MWh), to cope with uncertain wind variations.
Mathematically, the proposed clearing model materializes
into a well-behaved linear programming (LP) problem
that can be efficiently solved using commercially available
software.
B. Literature Review and Contributions
The proposed model relates to that reported in [11], which
formulates a two-stage stochastic model to represent market
clearing and system operation under equipment failures. This
model is extended in [6] to incorporate wind power producers.
The rationale of such a type of models is analyzed in [12] using
a generic mathematical framework. The model in [12], which
includes a price scheme similar to the one used in this paper,
allows production offers to differ between energy and reserve
deployment, which may constitute a gaming incentive for some
producers.
We propose a single auction that clears the market and finan-
cially settles it. Such a proposal is motivated by current practice
in some European markets with high wind integration, as is the
case of the electricity market in the Iberian Peninsula (with 25%
of its installed capacity being wind power) or that in Western
Denmark (with 32% of its installed capacity being wind power).
The proposed model is essentially different than those described
in [13] and [14], which do not explicitly represent the sequence
market-clearing and system-operation.
As opposed to [15], we price energy through the pool prices,
and deployed reserve through the balancing prices. Following
sound economic principles, we do not price reserve capacity as
reserve capacity does not entail specific costs to producers, and
pricing reserve capacity may lead to significant price inconsis-
tencies in case of multiple equally probable operation scenarios.
This is the case in pools with significant wind power production,
where pricing marginally reserve capacity may lead to dispro-
portionate reserve capacity prices.
Within the above framework, the contributions of this paper
are threefold:
1) To promote a marginal pricing scheme (including pool
prices and balancing prices) that is tailored to an electricity
pool that includes a significant number of wind producers.
2) To derive prices (pool and balancing) as dual variables of
the energy balance constraints of an LP problem. There-
fore, such prices are calculated in a simple and robust
manner.
3) To report and analyze results from a detailed case study that
illustrates the direct applicability of the proposed pricing
scheme.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the proposed clearing model, its mathematical
formulation and the consequent pricing scheme, which is sub-
sequently illustrated using a three-node system in Section III.
Section IV reports and discusses results from a realistic case
study. Section V provides some relevant conclusions. Finally,
the cost-recovery and revenue-adequacy properties (in ex-
pectation) of the proposed pricing scheme are proved in the
Appendix.
II. MARKET-CLEARING MODEL
The market-clearing model formulated below is intended for
the simultaneous and anticipated dispatch of energy and reserve
deployment (energy and reserve co-optimization). Out of this
model, a pricing scheme is fabricated to remunerate scheduled
production (at pool prices) and deployed reserve (at balancing
prices). Formulation (1) below is based on the following sim-
plifying assumptions.
1) For simplicity, only wind generation uncertainty is taken
into account. Notwithstanding this, demand uncertainty
would be treated analogously. Likewise, note that an N-1
criterion (protecting against generation unit and transmis-
sion line single failures) can be easily embedded within
the proposed market-clearing procedure.
2) Loads are assumed to be inelastic.
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3) The proposed market-clearing algorithm consists in a
single-period auction. Thus, inter-temporal constraints
are excluded from the market-clearing formulation. In
practice, these constraints are generally enforced ex post
by using, for example, some ad hoc rules as in the case
of the Electricity Market of the Iberian Peninsula [16]
or by setting the outcomes of each single-period market
clearing as the initial conditions for the subsequent one.
Ramping limits are important and may complicate the
operation of the system if neither hydro resources nor
CCGTs are available. In the proposed model, we disregard
ramping limits for the sake of simplicity. However, note
that incorporating ramping limits in the proposed model is
straightforward, either if clearing a single period (myopic
ramping limits) or clearing a multiple-period horizon.
4) Additionally, the minimum power output of each gener-
ating unit is assumed to be zero. This way, we sidestep the
tricky issue of non-convex prices.
5) Generation-side energy production cost functions are as-
sumed to be linear. This assumption is made to facilitate
mathematical derivations.
6) Network losses are neglected, as it is common practice in
market-clearing procedures.
7) The cost of deploying reserve is the cost of energy produc-
tion. This way, the reserve deployment cost is calculated
from the supply cost functions submitted in advance (e.g.,
one day ahead) by generating units.
8) Wind power uncertainty can be efficiently modeled
through a finite set of scenarios. This assumption is
required for the proposed market-clearing model to be
computationally solvable.
9) Themarket administrator uses all the available information
at the time of clearing the market to maximize the social
welfare of the market. This information includes scenario
sets modeling wind production from the different wind
farms. This way, key factors such as correlation between
wind sites can be accounted for in pursuit of the social wel-
fare maximization.
In relation to assumption 9 above, note that if wind genera-
tors are allowed to submit their own estimate of their probability
distributions to the market, then key information such as the cor-
relation of the power produced by wind farms at different sites
is lost. This is clearly detrimental to wind producers, especially
in highly wind-penetrated markets. For instance, suppose that
each wind producer submits its own scenario set independently
and the proposed market is cleared accordingly. In the case that
their power outputs were indeed significantly correlated, the
“free capacity” scheduled day ahead could not be enough to
perform the required adjustments in real time with a high prob-
ability, thus increasing social costs. Consequently, a central-
ized administrator collecting information from every wind farm
is needed. Note that this market administrator behavior does
not deviate from the market administrator behavior regarding
the load, which generally involves detailed load predictions at
all buses throughout the network. Additionally, this centralized
task could be somehow decentralized by means of “wind ag-
gregators” covering a sufficient number of wind farms.
The market-clearing model that results from these assump-
tions translates into a linear programming problem that can be
efficiently solved by using commercially available software,
e.g., [17].
A. Formulation
We consider a short-term electricity market that is cleared,
usually one day in advance, by solving the following linear op-
timization problem:
(1a)
(1b)
(1c)
(1d)
(1e)
(1f)
(1g)
(1h)
(1i)
(1j)
(1k)
(1l)
(1m)
(1n)
(1o)
(1p)
where
is the set of primal variables.
The objective function (1a) to be minimized is the expected
cost of the power system operation. This cost is made up of the
cost of energy production, which is incurred by both the conven-
tional power plants and wind farms, and the cost of involuntary
load curtailments. Observe that the term is
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constant and as such, can be removed from the objective func-
tion. Constraints (1b) and (1c) are power balance equations.
Specifically, constraints (1b) enforce the power balance on dis-
patched quantities, while constraints (1c) guarantee that the un-
expected deviations of the wind generation are covered by de-
ploying reserve and/or shedding load, if necessary. Constraints
(1d) limit the power dispatched for each generating unit to its
capacity. Similarly, the amount of wind power production from
each wind farm that is considered to settle the energy dispatch is
bounded from above by constraint (1e), being the upper bound
the power block offered by the wind farm under consideration.
Constraints (1f) and (1g) guarantee that the reserve deployed by
each generating unit at the real-time stage does not exceed its
reserve capacity offer. In this sense, the reserve capacity offers
and should be consistent with the time interval
over which the real-time re-dispatch is to be carried out. In this
paper, we consider hourly time steps and therefore, the reserve
capacity offers should be, at most, the 1-hour ramp rate of gen-
erating units. Constraints (1h) and (1i) ensure that the power
production of each generator is kept above zero and below its
capacity. The set of constraints (1j) and (1k) enforces the trans-
mission capacity limits. Constraints (1l) and (1m) are common-
sense bounds according to which the amount of load that is in-
voluntarily shed and the amount of wind power that is spilled are
smaller than or equal to the actual load consumption and the ac-
tual wind power production, respectively. Constraints (1n) and
(1o) set node 1 as the reference node. The series of constraints
(1p) constitutes variable declarations. Note that the dual vari-
ables associated with each group of constraints are indicated
after the corresponding equalities or inequalities, separated by
a colon.
Problem (1) models a single-auction process that clears the
market and financially settles it. We describe the proposed
market organization as a single-settlement scheme in that the
amount of energy to be traded both day ahead and in real
time, and the corresponding clearing prices are simultaneously
determined in a single shot, as opposed to current market
practices in most countries where these electricity transactions
are settled in two sequentially cleared auctions. Since the pro-
posed market-clearing procedure considers “all possible” wind
realizations (via scenarios), all possible real-time settlements
are considered within the stochastic programming procedure.
In other words, the outcomes of the proposed algorithm are
the best clearing of the market under uncertainty and the best
pre-dispatch for all possible settlements associated with all
possible wind production realizations. Therefore, as long as the
real-time stage of the proposed market-clearing model provides
a good enough approximation of the actual real-time adjust-
ments, the schedule resulting from the proposed model is better
than or equal to that derived from a two sequentially cleared
auctions in which the day-ahead and real-time dispatches are
optimized independently. The resulting scheme of prices is
thus consistent with the maximization of the expected social
welfare in markets that are to be cleared under uncertainty. The
practical interpretation of “real-time dispatch”, however, may
vary from market to market. In principle, it should correspond
to the actual dispatch over a short period of time (typically
ranging from minutes to one hour).
Additionally, it should be noted that as the proposed single
market settlement encompasses, in advance, the energy trans-
actions negotiated from day ahead to real time, it concentrates
a large trading volume, thus decreasing market power. In a
market organization consisting of two sequentially cleared
markets, physical participants may, for instance, withhold some
capacity day ahead to put it into play in real time with a view
to increasing revenues. In many European markets, where
real-time auctions are basically used just as markets to correct
deviations, the energy volume traded in such markets is some-
times so small that real-time prices tend to be very volatile and
susceptible to manipulation. Note that this put wind producers
in an unfavorable and risky situation. However, in the proposed
market settlement, which co-optimizes day-ahead and real-time
dispatches in a single shot, exercising market power becomes
more involved.
Observe that the market-clearing model (1) solely accounts
for energy (as opposed to capacity), in the form of the dis-
patched quantities in the day-ahead schedule and the reserve
deployed in the real-time stage. Notwithstanding this, the pro-
posed market settlement is fully compatible with the so-called
“reserve capacity markets” (which are currently implemented in
the Danish area of the Nordpool [18], for instance) with a view
to promoting and rewarding the flexibility of conventional gen-
erators, and ensuring the availability of reserve capacity in the
real-time operation. Furthermore, reserve capacity costs can be
easily incorporated into market-clearing model (1) in the form
of reserve capacity bids, as in [6] and [11]. To this end, we just
need to replace constraints (1f) and (1g) above by constraints
(2) below, and add the term to the ob-
jective function (1a), with and being the upward and
downward reserve capacities scheduled for unit , and and
their respective declared costs:
(2a)
(2b)
(2c)
(2d)
Some authors, though, are not in favor of considering reserve
capacity bids, because the provision of reserve capacity does
not entail intrinsic costs to producers (see, for instance, [14]).
Nevertheless, as illustrated later in Section III, reserve capacity
bids may be, however, useful within the context of electricity
markets that are “stochastically” cleared for the following three
reasons:
1) To competitively reward the availability of reserve ca-
pacity to make real-time adjustments.
2) To reduce the risk of economic losses faced by generators
deploying reserve at the real-time stage. This is a direct
consequence of the previous point.
3) To avoid possible multiple solutions to problem (1) by
giving “priority” to the day-ahead dispatch of generators
over their real-time redispatch.
In the following section, we state the pricing scheme fabri-
cated out of the market-clearing model (1).
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B. Pricing Scheme
Energy transactions settled via the market-clearing tool (1)
are priced as follows:
1) Each generating unit located at bus is paid for its sched-
uled power production at a price .
2) Each load located at bus is charged for its power con-
sumption at a price .
3) Each wind farm located at bus is paid for its scheduled
wind power production at a price .
4) Each generating unit at bus deploying upward reserve
in scenario is paid for its overproduction at a price
.
5) Each generating unit at bus deploying downward re-
serve in scenario is charged for its power withdrawal
at a price . In this case, should be understood as a
repurchase price.
6) Each wind farm at bus with production surplus in sce-
nario is paid for its excess of generation
at a price .
7) Each wind farm at bus with generation shortage in
scenario is charged for its production deficit
at a price .
This pricing scheme exhibits two important features, namely:
1) It is revenue adequate in expectation, i.e., the payments that
the system/market operator must make to and receive from
the participants do not cause it to incur a financial deficit.
The probabilistic term expectation is required here due to
the intrinsic dependence of the outcomes of the market-
clearing tool (1) on the actual realization of wind genera-
tion. Intuitively speaking, a market settlement is said to be
revenue adequate in expectation provided that it does not
cause the system/market operator to run a financial deficit
over time if used repeatedly over many trading periods.
2) It guarantees that the expected profit of the generating units
(including the wind farms) is greater than or equal to their
operating costs.
Proofs for both properties, revenue adequacy and cost re-
covery in expectation, are provided in the Appendix.
From an economic perspective, pool prices (“day-ahead
prices”, ) account for the impact on the expected social
welfare of a marginal certain increase in load. To supply
this marginal certain increase in load, inflexible units can be
used by means of day-ahead planning. Real-time prices
account for the impact on the expected social welfare of a
marginal uncertain increase in load under a particular scenario.
This marginal increase in load, for being uncertain, cannot be
supplied by inflexible units, as these cannot be re-dispatched. In
principle, the locational marginal prices (LMPs) derived from
a deterministic day-ahead market-clearing algorithm are not
related to the “day-ahead prices” obtained from the proposed
clearing algorithm, as the latter also account for the anticipated
impact of marginal load increases on the real-time dispatch
costs. Likewise, the LMPs resulting from a deterministic
real-time market are not necessarily connected to the real-time
prices provided by the proposed market-clearing algorithm
because the day-ahead dispatches in both settlements will
be probably different. Nevertheless, since both sets of LMPs
Fig. 1. Three-node system.
emanate from the same physical reality, they should not be
expected to differ dramatically.
In practice, the real-time realization of the wind generation
is not likely to be contained in the scenario set used to settle
the market. In this case, according to [13, Theorem 1], bal-
ancing prices can always be determined by just solving the
second stage of the proposed market-clearing model with the
first-stage variables fixed to their optimal values, for the spe-
cific realization of the uncertain parameters. Note that this does
not mean that a separate “real-time market” needs to be orga-
nized. It just means that balancing prices need to be recomputed
for the specific uncertainty outcome. Moreover, if the uncer-
tainty modeling is accurate enough, by definition, these real-
time prices will approximately preserve the theoretical proper-
ties stated above, i.e., revenue reconciliation and cost recovery
for producers in expectation.
Finally, we would like to point out that financial transmission
rights (FTRs) can be implemented within the proposed market
framework and used to refund congestion revenues collected by
the transmission system operator to agents and to better allow
agents to hedge congestion costs resulting from their energy pur-
chases and sales in the market. However, FTRs are outside the
scope of this paper.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
The proposed pricing scheme is illustrated next using the
three-node system sketched in Fig. 1. Line reactances and ca-
pacities are all equal to 0.13 p.u. and 100 MW, respectively.
The system includes three conventional generators (G1, G2, and
G3) and one wind power plant (WP). Data for the conventional
units are provided in Table I. Note that, comparatively speaking,
unit G1 is cheap, but inflexible; unit G2 is relatively cheap, but
flexible; and unit G3 is expensive, but flexible. The wind plant
is located at node 2. Its uncertain power output is modeled by
means of three scenarios, which are referred to as medium (35
MW), high (50 MW), and low (10 MW), with probabilities of
occurrence equal to 0.5, 0.2, and 0.3, in that order. The power
block offered by the wind producer is assumed to be equal to
its forecasted power production (i.e., 30.5 MW). The three-bus
system also includes an inelastic load (L3) of 200 MW located
at node 3, with a value of lost load equal to $1000/MWh.
The market is cleared based on this information. Market out-
comes related to dispatched quantities and deployed reserve are
collated in Table II. The scheduled wind power production
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TABLE I
GENERATOR DATA—THREE-BUS SYSTEM
TABLE II
MARKET OUTCOMES—THREE-BUS SYSTEM. POWERS IN MW
TABLE III
ENERGY AND BALANCING PRICES—THREE-BUS SYSTEM. PRICES IN $/MWH
is equal to 20 MW. The resulting energy and balancing
prices are shown in Table III. Note that electricity prices are the
same at all nodes in the system, because the network does not
become congested in any of the three considered wind power
scenarios. Given the energy and balancing prices in Table III and
the dispatched quantities in Table II, the payments tomarket par-
ticipants per scenario can be computed. For instance, the pay-
ment to generator G3 in scenario low is given by
. Furthermore, considering that the energy produc-
tion cost of unit G3 is equal to $30/MWh, the profit that it makes
in scenario low is . Table IV pro-
vides the benefit obtained by market participants both per sce-
nario and in expectation. Observe that the profit made by gen-
erator G3 is indeed a random variable whose expected value
is equal to zero. Generator
G3 can be seen then as the marginal unit in a stochastic sense.
The randomness of its profit is inherited from the uncertain char-
acter of the reserve deployment service, which in turn depends
on the actual wind power realization. The proposed market set-
tlement guarantees cost recovery for generating units in expec-
tation, but this does not prevent generator G3 from incurring
economic losses in scenarios medium and low (see Table IV).
To reduce the risk of negative profits faced by market partici-
pants that are willing to make real-time adjustments, reserve ca-
pacity bids can be introduced in the proposed market settlement
as stated in Section II-A. Consider that generator G2 offers both
downward and upward reserve capacity at a cost of $1/MW,
while generator G3 does it at a cost of $2/MW. Table V shows
the day-ahead schedule and the real-time redispatch in this case.
The wind power production scheduled at the day-ahead stage is
20 MW again. Likewise, Tables VI and VII list, respectively,
the clearing prices and the profit made by market participants
TABLE IV
PROFIT OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS—THREE-BUS SYSTEM. PROFIT IN $
TABLE V
MARKET OUTCOMES WITH RESERVE CAPACITY BIDS—THREE-BUS
SYSTEM. POWERS IN MW
TABLE VI
ENERGY AND BALANCING PRICES WITH RESERVE CAPACITY
BIDS—THREE-BUS SYSTEM. PRICES IN $/MWH
TABLE VII
PROFIT OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS WITH RESERVE CAPACITY
BIDS—THREE-BUS SYSTEM. PROFIT IN $
per scenario and in expectation when the aforementioned re-
serve capacity bids are taken into account to clear the market.
As an example, observe that the benefit of generator G3 in sce-
nario low is now given by , where
we ignore the “costs” related to the reserve capacity bids inas-
much as the provision of reserve capacity does not entail specific
costs to generators. Note, indeed, that generator G3 does not in-
curr economic losses in any of the three considered scenarios.
Furthermore, its expected profit is equal to 60, i.e., greater than
0. Therefore, the possibility of bidding reserve capacity serves
to competitively reward the capability of and the willingness
to make real-time adjustments, thus promoting the flexibility of
market participants in an efficient manner.
Lastly, we point out that accounting for reserve capacity
bids avoids the existence of possible multiple solutions to the
market-clearing model (1). For instance, Table VIII provides
an alternative market scheduling to that shown in Table II.
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TABLE VIII
ALTERNATIVE MARKET SCHEDULING TO THAT IN TABLE II. POWERS IN MW
TABLE IX
RESERVE CAPACITIES OFFERED BY GENERATING UNITS
Observe that, in terms of social welfare, the following two
actions are equivalent:
1) To dispatch generator G2 to 50 MW and the wind farm to
20 MW at the day ahead-stage (see Table II).
2) To dispatch generator G2 to 39.5 MW and the wind farm
to 30.5 MW at the day-ahead stage and then redispatch
generator G2 to 50MW at the real-time stage by deploying
10.5 MW of upward reserve in any of the three possible
wind power realizations considered (see Table VIII).
In contrast, if the market settlement allows for reserve ca-
pacity bids (different from zero), such a type of dispatch deci-
sions are not equivalent anymore.
IV. CASE STUDY
The pricing scheme described in Section II-B is further illus-
trated using a 24-bus system based on the single-area version
of the IEEE Reliability Test System—1996 [19]. For simplicity,
the generating units of this well-known system are grouped by
node and type. The only purpose behind this grouping is to fa-
cilitate the presentation and analysis of the simulation results.
Thus, the simplified system consists of 34 lines, 12 generating
units, and 17 loads. On the assumption of a perfectly compet-
itive electricity market, the energy offers submitted by gener-
ating units represent their marginal costs of energy production,
which are indicated in [19, Table VI]. We assume that nuclear
and hydro power producers offer their energy production at zero
price. The amount of reserve capacity that each generating unit
is willing to provide, either downward or upward, is listed in
Table IX. We assume that the nuclear and hydro generators
are not technically able to provide reserve. No reserve capacity
costs are considered.
Two wind farms comprising 2.5-MW wind turbines Nordex
N80/2500 with a hub height of 105 m are located at nodes 7 and
8. The power curve of this turbine model is publicly available
in [20]. Wind speeds at both wind sites are described by means
of the same Weibull distribution with scale and shape parame-
ters equal to 9.7 and 1.6, respectively. This probability distribu-
tion for wind speeds, in combination with the considered wind
turbine model, results in a capacity factor for both wind farms
of approximately 40%. This capacity factor has been estimated
using theWind Turbine Power Calculator provided in [20]. Be-
sides,wind speeds at bothwind sites are assumed to be correlated
with a correlation coefficient of 0.5. Correlated samples are then
obtained by using the sampling procedure described in [21]. An
original set of 10 000 samples is first generated and subsequently
reduced to 100 by applying the scenario reduction technique pro-
posed in [22] and [23]. Selecting the right number of scenarios
constitutes a tradeoff between model accuracy and tractability.
We believe that current computationalmachinery allows consid-
ering a large enough number of scenarios. Note that the number
of scenarios should be large enough so that adding any additional
scenario does not change the market outcomes (preferably) or
minimally changes them.We assume that wind power producers
offer their forecast production at zero price. Note that nowadays
this offering strategy constitutes a common practice for wind
producers participating in electricity markets [24], [25].
The results reported below corresponds to one single period
characterized by a total system demand of 2850 MW. This de-
mand is geographically distributed among nodes as specified in
[19, Table V]. Loads are assumed to be inelastic with a value of
lost load equal to $2000/MWh. Results for two different wind
penetrations levels, 12.3% and 26.3%, are presented. The wind
penetration level is given as the ratio of the installed wind ca-
pacity to the total system demand. The number of wind turbines
in the farms at nodes 7 and 8 that are required to achieve these
penetration levels are 40 and 100, and 100 and 200, respectively.
The market-clearing problem has been solved using CPLEX
9.0.2 under GAMS [17] on aWindows-based personal computer
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 with four processors clocking at 2.4 GHz
and 6 GB of RAM. The required computational time is around
five seconds.
For low wind penetration levels, such as 12.3%, there is
enough room in the transmission network to accommodate the
energy transactions settled at the market stage plus the sub-
sequent energy redispatches in the form of deployed reserve
without the occurrence of congestion events. Therefore, thewind
energy injected at nodes 7 and 8 is able to reach every node in the
systemand as a result, no differences in prices exist amongnodes.
In particular, for a wind penetration level of 12.3%, the energy
price is equal to $19.9/MWh at every node. Likewise, the
probability-removed balancing prices under the highest and
lowestwindproduction scenarios,whichwill bedenoted, respec-
tively, by and hereafter, are $16.0/MWh and
$21.7/MWhin thatorder, irrespectiveof thenodeunder consider-
ation. These probability-removed balancing prices are obtained
by dividing each dual variable by its associated probability
. This way, the energy prices and the probability-removed
balancing prices are of the same order of magnitude. Further,
according to [13], the balancing prices so transformed are dual
optimal for the real-timemarketmodel that results from problem
(1) once the wind power uncertainty is disclosed and first-stage
variables (scheduled quantities) are fixed to their optimal values.
On the contrary, for high enough wind penetration levels, e.g.,
26.3%, network bottlenecks become probable and consequently,
the nodal prices differ. As an example, Table X shows, for this
wind penetration level, the values of the energy price and the
probability-removed balancing prices under the highest and
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TABLE X
ENERGY AND BALANCING PRICES ($/MWH) AT SELECTED NODES.
WIND PENETRATION LEVEL OF 26.3%
TABLE XI
PAYMENTS TO MARKET PARTICIPANTS
lowest wind production realizations at some selected nodes. In
light of theseprices, the following threeobservations are inorder:
1) In the scenario of highest wind power production, the bal-
ancing prices are zero at the nodes where the wind farms
are connected, namely, nodes 7 and 8. The reason for this
is that any marginal increment of load at these nodes is sat-
isfied, in this scenario, by the wind energy production that
would be otherwise spilled due to the network congestion.
2) The balancing price in the scenario of lowest wind power
production is node-independent. This is so because, under
this scenario, the network does not become congested.
3) Even though the scheduled productions do not cause
network congestion at the market stage, the energy price
differs among nodes. This highlights the coupling between
energy and balancing prices induced by the two-stage
stochastic programming approach. Intuitively speaking,
the energy price anticipates probable network bottlenecks
during the real-time operation of the power system.
The payments to market participants under the proposed
pricing scheme are indicated in Table XI for the two considered
wind penetration levels. While the system operator makes
payments to producers, it receives payments from consumers.
This is why the payments to loads in this table are expressed
in negative numbers. Observe that if the wind penetration
level grows, the payments to conventional producers diminish,
whereas the payments to wind producers increase. Logically,
there is a transfer of revenues from conventional generators to
wind producers at the same time that the payments from loads
are reduced due to the free character of the wind energy. In
either case, revenue adequacy in expectation is guaranteed. In
fact, for a wind power penetration level of 26.3% (condition
such that network congestion events are probable) the system
operator is expected to incur a financial surplus of $728.1.
Lastly, Tables XII and XIII provide, respectively, the ex-
pected profits achieved by conventional and wind producers
under the proposed pricing scheme. Observe that all the partici-
pants recover their production costs in expectation, thus making
an expected profit greater than or equal to zero. In general, the
TABLE XII
EXPECTED PROFIT OF CONVENTIONAL GENERATING UNITS ($)
TABLE XIII
EXPECTED PROFIT OF WIND PRODUCERS ($)
expected profits of conventional producers decrease as they are
displaced from the energy supply by an increasing wind power
penetration. Only generating units 3 and 4 see their expected
profit increased due to the fact that they get more involved in
the deployment of reserve with the increment in wind power
penetration.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper describes a pricing scheme for a pool that incor-
porates a significant number of wind producers. The analysis
carried out leads to the following conclusions:
1) The proposed pricing scheme is adapted to the specificities
of wind producers, characterized by their variability and
unpredictability. This constitutes no harm to conventional
producers.
2) This pricing scheme is marginal and results in both cost
recovery for producers and revenue reconciliation, both in
expectation.
3) Two sets of marginal prices are derived: pool prices that
reflect energy scheduling and balancing prices that reflect
system operation.
4) The proposed prices are derived from the solution of an
LP problem. Thus, they are obtained in an easy and robust
manner.
5) The pricing scheme described in this paper does not
embody non-convexities (e.g., start-up costs or minimum
power output constraints). Future work is needed to incor-
porate such non-convexities.
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APPENDIX
A. Revenue Adequacy in Expectation
Mathematically, the proposed market settlement is revenue
adequate in expectation if, at the optimum, it holds
(3)
where is the probability-removed real-time prices and
superscript “ ” denotes optimal values.
Using the power balance (1b) and (1c), expression (3) can be
equivalently rewritten as follows:
(4)
Let us consider the following partial Lagrangian function of
problem (1):
(5)
Since problem (1) is linear and thus convex, is minimized
subject to the rest of constraints, i.e., constraints (1d)–(1p),
at the optimum. Note that by moving the power balance (1b)
and (1c) to the objective function (1a) to form the partial
Lagrangian function , the resulting optimization problem
[minimize (5), subject to (1d)–(1p)] can be decomposed into
appropriate minimization subproblems for any given set of
prices . In particular, the summation of
the following terms, extracted from (5)
(6)
is minimized subject to constraints (1j)–(1l) and (1n)–(1p) at the
optimum.
A solution such that ; ;
, is feasible for the minimization subproblem [mini-
mize (6), subject to (1j)–(1l) and (1n)–(1p)]. This solution al-
lows us to set the upper bound of expression (6) to zero. Given
that , inequality (4) holds and
therefore, the proposed market settlement is revenue adequate
in expectation.
B. Cost Recovery in Expectation
The proposed market settlement ensures that the generating
units (including wind farms) recover their energy production
costs in expectation. Mathematically, this is expressed as
follows:
(7)
and
(8)
where superscript “ ” denotes optimal values.
Let us consider again the partial Lagrangian function (5). At
the optimum, this function is minimized subject to constraints
(1d)–(1p). As stated in the proof for revenue adequacy in ex-
pectation, the optimization problem [minimize (5), subject to
(1d)–(1p)] can be decomposed into appropriate minimization
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subproblems for any given set of prices .
Specifically, the series of terms extracted from (5)
(9)
(10)
are minimized, for all and for all , subject to the set of con-
straints [(1d), (1f)–(1i), (1p)] and [(1e), (1m), (1p)], respec-
tively.
The collection of primal variables such that
(here, we require that generators can be dispatched to zero),
and , constitutes a feasible solution to
the minimization subproblem made up of the objective func-
tion (9) and the group of constraints (1d), (1f)–(1i), and (1p).
Likewise, the set of primal variables such that ,
and , is a feasible solution to the mini-
mization subproblem composed of the objective function (10)
and constraints (1e), (1m), and (1p). This pair of solutions sets
the upper bound of expressions (9) and (10) to zero and conse-
quently, inequalities (7) and (8) hold. Therefore, the proposed
pricing scheme guarantees cost recovery in expectation for
both conventional and wind power producers.
It is important to note that the decomposition-based reasoning
above cannot be used to prove cost recovery per scenario due to
the market-stage variables and , which link all the sce-
narios together. In fact, numerical results show that the sug-
gested pricing scheme allows power producers to incur eco-
nomic losses in some scenarios as long as they recover their
production costs in expectation, i.e., in the long run and under
similar conditions.
The reasoning above is also valid if reserve capacity bids are
considered within the proposed market-clearing model (1). In
this case, the cost recovery in expectation leads to inequality
(11) below, which states that the expected profit made by gener-
ator from selling energy is greater than or equal to its reserve
capacity costs. Therefore, insofar as the provision of reserve ca-
pacity does not entail specific costs to generating units, reserve
capacity bids allow producers to reduce the risk of incurring
economic losses:
(11)
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